A
note at the bottom of the page from the director of one IIS division recommends approving the request, noting, "we may find
in this envoy a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden."
Four
days later, on February 23, final approval is granted. "The permission of Mr. Deputy Director of Intelligence has been gained
on 21 February for this operation, to secure a reservation for one of the intelligence services guests for one week in one
of the first class hotels," the Al Mansour Melia hotel in Baghdad.
That
same day, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, joined by leaders of four additional Islamic terrorist groups, announced
the formation of the World Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, soon to become better known as al Qaeda. The grievances
in the fatwa focused on Iraq. The
terrorist leaders decried the presence of U.S. troops
on the Arabian Peninsula. They protested the "great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people
by the crusader-Zionist alliance." They cited American support for Israel and
surmised that the United States sought to distract world attention
from the killing of Muslims in Jerusalem. To support this claim, the fatwa
turned once again to Iraq: "The best proof of this is their
eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab
state."
The
fatwa declared: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."
The
al Qaeda envoy to Iraq arrived in Baghdad on
March 5, 1998. Notes in the margins of the Iraqi
Intelligence memos indicate that Mohammed F. Mohammed stayed for more than two weeks in Room 414 of the Al Mansour Melia Hotel
as the guest of Iraqi Intelligence. After extending his trip by one week, bin Laden's emissary departed on March 16.
Adding
to the intrigue, the 9/11 Commission reported that "[i]n March 1998, after bin Laden's public fatwa against the United States,
two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence." Were there two separate al Qaeda trips to Iraq in
March 1998? It's possible that the IIS documents and the 9/11 Commission report refer to the same meeting. But the Iraqi Intelligence
documents refer to one al Qaeda envoy, the 9/11 Commission report mentions two--raising the possibility that two separate
meetings took place.
* * *
"The
consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al Shifa. There were three different [chemical weapons]
structures in the Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no question that the Iraqis were there."
Interview with John Gannon, former chairman of the CIA's
National Intelligence Council, October 25, 2004
OPEN
SOURCE REPORTING suggests the relationship continued throughout the spring and summer of 1998. William Safire of the New
York Times and Yossef Bodansky, former director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare,
have both reported the presence of an al Qaeda delegation at a birthday celebration for Saddam Hussein in April 1998.
In
a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy on
May 22, 1998, President Clinton warned that our
enemies "may deploy compact and relatively cheap weapons of mass destruction--not just nuclear, but also chemical or biological,
to use disease as a weapon of war. Sometimes the terrorists and criminals act alone. But increasingly, they are interconnected,
and sometimes supported by hostile countries." Hostile countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Sudan.
Although
Osama bin Laden left Sudan in 1996, many al Qaeda operatives
stayed behind. According to testimony from several al Qaeda terrorists now in U.S. custody,
al Qaeda operatives worked closely with Sudanese intelligence. Sudanese intelligence provided security for al Qaeda camps
and safehouses. These agents intervened when local Sudanese authorities arrested al Qaeda members for exploding bombs at an
al Qaeda farm, securing the release of the detained terrorists. Jamal al Fadl, an al Qaeda terrorist who later cooperated
with U.S. prosecutors, testified that he was
ordered by Sudanese intelligence to assassinate a political rival to Hassan al-Turabi. Even after bin Laden's departure, al
Qaeda and Sudanese intelligence were virtually indistinguishable.
Shortly
after Clinton's speech, the CIA produced
an assessment of WMD proliferation that covered the first half of 1998.
"Sudan," it said, "has been developing the capability
to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, Sudan obtained
help from other countries, principally Iraq. Given
its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may
be interested in a BW program as well." CIA assessments through 2002 included similar analyses.
In
July 1998, according to the 9/11 Commission report, "an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to
meet first with the Taliban and then with bin Laden." Referring to the March and July meetings between Iraq and al Qaeda,
the Commission noted that "sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through bin
Laden's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis." In a maddening omission, the report does not elaborate
on the "ties" between al Qaeda's No. 2 and the Iraqi regime.
Trouble
was clearly brewing. On July 29, the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) warned
of "possible Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack by UBL [Osama bin Laden]." But when the attack came,
it was by conventional means: On August 7, al Qaeda terrorists struck the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, killing
224--including 12 Americans--and injuring more than 4,000. Almost immediately,
the CIA assigned responsibility to terrorists affiliated with Osama bin Laden.
The
U.S. response came two weeks later, on August 20, striking
two targets. The first of these, al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, was
uncontroversial. The second target--the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan--almost
immediately gave rise to great controversy.
In
justifying the strike on al Shifa, the Clinton administration pointed to several pieces of evidence: a soil sample indicating
the presence of a precursor for VX nerve gas of Iraqi provenance; the presence of Iraqi chemical weapons experts at the plant;
the long history of Iraq-Sudanese collaboration on chemical weapons; and telephone intercepts between senior Shifa officials
and Emad Al Ani, the father of Iraq's chemical weapons program.
The
press treated these claims with great skepticism. But Clinton administration officials and many intelligence analysts would
continue to defend the intelligence surrounding al Shifa for years. In a January 23, 1999, article in the Washington Post, National Security Council counterterrorism
director Richard Clarke defended the president's choice of target and said that "intelligence exists linking bin Laden to
al Shifa's current and past operators, the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan." In an email he
sent on November 4, 1998, to National Security Adviser Sandy
Berger, Clarke concluded that the presence of Iraqi chemical experts in Sudan was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al
Qaeda agreement."
President
Clinton's secretary of defense, William Cohen, continued to defend the decision to strike al Shifa before the 9/11 Commission
last year. Cohen explained that there were "multiple, reinforcing elements of information ranging from links that the organization
that built the facility [al Shifa] had both with bin Laden and with the leadership of the Iraqi chemical weapons program."
In
an interview with THE WEEKLY STANDARD last fall, 9/11 Commission co-chairman Thomas Kean said: "Top officials--Bill
Clinton, Sandy Berger, and others--told us with absolute certainty that there were chemical weapons of mass destruction at
that factory, and that's why we sent missiles." Kean added: "We still can't say for certain that the chemicals were there.
If they're right and there was stuff there, then it had to come from Iraq. They're the ones who had the stuff, who had this
technology."
In
fact, the Iraqis were openly involved with the al Shifa facility. Sudanese foreign minister Osman Ismail was in Baghdad when
the plant was attacked. He told reporters the facility was nothing more than a pharmaceutical factory. As proof he pointed
to the existence of a contract awarded to al Shifa through the U.N. Oil-for-Food program. But the contract raised questions
even then. In the eight months between the signing of the $199,000 contract and the U.S. strikes on al Shifa, no goods were
delivered. With the benefit of hindsight, we now understand that Saddam Hussein manipulated the Oil-for-Food program to reward
friends and business partners willing to help him circumvent U.N. sanctions and rebuild his weapons programs. U.S. counterterrorism
officials tell The Weekly Standard that relatively few Oil-for-Food contracts went to Sudanese companies, and that the contract
with al Shifa stands out as troubling.
There
was reporting about an Iraqi presence at a number of facilities in Sudan. The Clinton administration chose al Shifa for destruction
largely because it was outside of Khartoum and was thus unlikely to result in a large number of casualties. There were several
other potential targets. "The consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al Shifa," says John Gannon,
who was chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the time. "There were three different [chemical weapons] structures
in the Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no question that the Iraqis were there."
As
for the August 1998 Iraq-al Qaeda plots against the U.S. and British embassies in Pakistan, revealed in the Guantanamo Summary
of Evidence obtained by the AP, we are left with more questions than answers. Has the detainee's story been corroborated?
Were the attacks in Pakistan what the CIA's counterterrorism center warned about on July
29? Were they to have been carried out in tandem with the August
7, 1998, al Qaeda embassy bombings? Were they intended as a rejoinder to the U.S. strikes on al Shifa? A Pentagon
spokesman says the government's policy against discussing detainees prevents him from providing any answers. Other Bush administration
and intelligence officials contacted by The Weekly Standard either did not know about the detainee or refused to discuss
the case.
On
August 27, 1998, Iraq's Babel newspaper,
published by Uday Hussein, labeled Osama bin Laden an "Arab and Islamic hero."
* * *
"Saddam
Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sealed a pact."
Milan's Corriere della Sera, December 28, 1998, as cited in the Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 328
SADDAM
HUSSEIN continued to defy U.N. weapons inspectors throughout the fall of 1998. Noncompliance was the norm. Confrontations
about access to suspected WMD sites became almost a daily occurrence.
Back
in Washington, members of both parties urged President Clinton to increase the pressure on Iraq. Congress was considering
legislation that would make "regime change" in Iraq official U.S. policy. The United States also began broadcasting anti-Hussein
messages into Iraq via Radio Free Iraq. The broadcasts were housed in the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in
Prague. The first broadcast went out on October 30, 1998. The
Iraqis were furious and threatened retaliation. On November 8, 1998, a
commentator on Iraqi state television insisted the broadcasts would do nothing to affect the "jihad spirit" of the Iraqis.
A statement three days later from Saddam's Baath party called on Muslims to be steadfast in the ongoing Mother of All Battles
and to undertake "unprecedented heroisms" to fight the Zionists and Crusaders. And then, a call for attacks:
All
living capabilities of the Arab nation should be toward the unity of the pan-Arab [world] and toward escalating the struggle
to the highest levels of jihad. . . . The escalation of the confrontation and the disclosure of its dimensions and the aggressive
intentions now require an organized, planned, influential and conclusive enthusiasm against U.S. interests.
This
was not, apparently, just bluster. The Iraqi regime wired $150,000 to an account in Prague, according to Jabir Salim, the
man on the receiving end. Salim was the Iraqi station chief in the Czech Republic and with the money he received an order:
Recruit a young Islamic radical to blow up the headquarters of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Salim had difficulty finding
someone to commit the martyrdom operation, he told British Intelligence after defecting to the West when the U.S. launched
Operation Desert Fox--a series of cruise missile attacks on Iraqi targets--on December 16, 1998. Salim also told interrogators that the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship had intensified
after the August 1998 embassy bombings and that the Iraqi Intelligence station in Pakistan served as the hub of Iraq-al Qaeda
activity.
Operation
Desert Fox would last four days. Saddam Hussein's response was revealing. On December 21, he dispatched one of his most trusted
intelligence operatives, Faruq Hijazi, to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden. Hijazi had met with both Zawahiri and bin Laden on
many occasions earlier in the decade. On December 26, Osama bin Laden condemned the U.S.-led attacks. "The British and the
American people loudly declared their support for their leaders' decision to attack Iraq," bin Laden proclaimed. He added
that this support made it the "duty of Muslims to confront, fight and kill" British and American citizens.
The
meeting between bin Laden and Hijazi instigated a burst of intelligence reporting on Iraq and al Qaeda. One source reported
that "the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim 'elements'
to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests."
These
claims were not limited to sensitive intelligence reporting. In the weeks that followed the meeting, dozens of press outlets
from around the world reported on it as well as several others. The reports indicated that Saddam had offered bin Laden safe
haven, had already trained al Qaeda operatives, and was supporting bin Laden's efforts to attack Western targets.
The
details reported were striking. On December 28 Milan's Corriere della Sera reported "Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden
have sealed a pact." In its issue dated January 11, 1999, Newsweek
quoted an anonymous "Arab intelligence officer who knows Saddam personally" as warning that "very soon you will be witnessing
large-scale terrorist activity run by the Iraqis" against Western targets. The Iraqi plan would be run under one of three
"false flags": Palestinian, Iranian, and the "al Qaeda apparatus." All of these groups, Newsweek reported, had representatives
in Baghdad.
The
reports did not end there. Throughout February and March 1999, there was media speculation that bin Laden would relocate from
Afghanistan to Iraq. Behind the scenes, Clinton administration officials were engaging in similar conjecture. According to
the 9/11 Commission report, Richard Clarke sent an email to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger on February 11, 1999. Clarke told Berger that if bin Laden learned of U.S. operations
against him, "old wily Osama will likely boogie to Baghdad." Days later Bruce Riedel of the National Security Council staff
also emailed Berger, warning that "Saddam Hussein wanted bin Laden in Baghdad." Reports of Iraqi offers of safe haven, cooperation,
and training continued throughout 1999.
* * *
"The
Shakir in Kuala Lumpur has many interesting connections that are so multiple in their intersections with al Qaeda-related
organizations and people as to suggest something more than random chance."
9/11 Commissioner John Lehman, July 22, 2004
TWO
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES believe that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national who escorted a September 11 hijacker to
the key planning meeting for those attacks in Kuala Lumpur, was working for Iraqi Intelligence: the Malaysians, who monitored
Shakir's activities as he facilitated the travel for 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar in January 2000, and the Jordanians,
who detained Shakir for three months after the September 11 attacks.
Shakir
began working as a VIP greeter for Malaysian Airlines in August 1999.
He told associates he had gotten the job through a contact at the Iraqi embassy named Ra'ad al-Mudaris. In fact, al-Mudaris
controlled Shakir's schedule--telling him when to report to work and when to take a day off. The Senate Intelligence Committee
report reveals that "another source claimed that Mudaris was a former IIS officer."
Al-Mudaris
apparently told Shakir to report to work on January 5, 2000, the
same day September 11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar arrived in Kuala Lumpur. Shakir escorted al Mihdhar to a waiting car and
then, rather than bid his guest farewell, jumped in the car with him. U.S. intelligence officials will not say whether Shakir
was an active participant in the meeting, but with photographs provided by Malaysian intelligence, there is little doubt he
was there. The meeting lasted from January 5 to January 8. Shakir reported to work twice after the meeting broke up and then
disappeared.
He
was arrested in Doha, Qatar, on September 17, 2001. He
had been employed by the Qatari government in its Ministry of Religious Development. Authorities found what Newsweek's
Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman described as a "treasure trove": contact information--both on Shakir and back at his apartment--for
several high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists. They include: Zaid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed;
Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, the Iraqi who participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; Abu Hajer al
Iraqi, the Iraqi national alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's "best friend"; and Ibrahim Suleiman, a Kuwaiti native whose
fingerprints were found on the bombmaking manuals authorities say were used in preparation for the 1993 Trade Center bombing.
We also know that in January 1993, shortly before the first attack on the World Trade Center, Shakir had received a phone
call later traced to the New Jersey safehouse that served as the headquarters for that operation.
Despite
this, the Qataris released Shakir. (The Qatari government has not responded to numerous interview requests.) But he was detained
again on October 21, 2001, this time by Jordanians in Amman,
where he was to have caught a flight to Baghdad. The Jordanians held him for three months. The Iraqi regime repeatedly contacted
the Jordanian government and pressed for his release. The Jordanians, who had concluded that Shakir was working for Iraqi
Intelligence, devised a plan and presented it to the CIA. The Jordanians proposed releasing
Shakir, but only after extracting from him a promise to report back on the activities of Iraqi Intelligence from inside Iraq.
Perhaps mindful of the woeful lack of human sources in Iraq, the CIA approved.
The Jordanians set him free in late January 2002, at which point he returned to Baghdad.
He
was never heard from again.
The
Weekly Standard asked 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman about Shakir last year, shortly after the commission's final report
was released. "The Shakir in Kuala Lumpur has many interesting connections that are so multiple in their intersections with
al Qaeda-related organizations and people as to suggest something more than random chance," he said. We clarified: "With respect
to both al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime?"
"Yes.
Both."
* * *
"Following
the expulsion of al Qaeda from Afghanistan and their arrival in northern Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (a senior al Qaeda figure)
was relatively free to travel within Iraq proper and to stay in Baghdad for some time. Several of his colleagues visited him
there."
The Butler Report, July
14, 2004
TEN DAYS BEFORE September
11, 2001, a small group of Islamic radicals came together in the northern, Kurdish-controlled area of Iraq. They
would quickly come to be known as Ansar al Islam. Their ranks swelled as hundreds of al Qaeda terrorists fled the U.S. assault
on the Taliban in Afghanistan. It quickly became clear to many policymakers and intelligence analysts that the Ansar camps
were fallback zones for al Qaeda.
In
time, one of Ansar's leaders would become the face of not only the Iraqi insurgency, but also of al Qaeda. Abu Musab al Zarqawi
is, besides Osama bin Laden, perhaps the best known al Qaeda terrorist on the planet. He and his followers have been linked
to terrorist plots the world over: from a plot in Jordan at the turn of the millennium, to the assassination of U.S. diplomat
Laurence Foley in October 2002, to the Madrid train bombing on March
11, 2004. His personal role in the beheadings of hostages in Iraq has provided a stark reminder of the brutality
of the jihadists.
As
the war in Iraq approached, the Bush administration cited Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad from May to July 2002--allegedly,
for medical treatment--as evidence that Saddam harbored and aided al Qaeda terrorists. This claim was met with a remarkable
degree of skepticism.
Prior
to September 11, there was nary a mention of Zarqawi. It appears that the intelligence community did not pay much attention
to him until after 9/11, when, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, "an ongoing collection" became "aggressively
worked." Thus, there is much uncertainty concerning his origins and exactly when his relationship with Saddam's regime began.
Recently,
Ayad Allawi, the first post-Saddam prime minister of Iraq, stated that Iraqi intelligence documents show that Zarqawi was
in Saddam-controlled parts of Iraq in late 1999. The documents, according to Allawi, also show that Zarqawi was setting up
sleeper cells with the full knowledge of Saddam's intelligence services. If the documents are authentic, and we cannot offer
a judgment one way or another, then they will put to rest any doubts about Zarqawi's involvement with Saddam's regime prior
to the war.
There
were many early reports that Iraqi intelligence officers were among Ansar's leadership and thus Zarqawi's cohorts. One of
these was a man known by his nom de guerre, Abu Wael. Ansar's Kurdish enemies, and several IIS and al Qaeda detainees,
claimed from the beginning that Abu Wael was an Iraqi Intelligence officer who managed the relationship between Ansar and
Saddam's regime. The Kurds have also repeatedly claimed that he, as well as other IIS officers, supplied Ansar with funding
and arms.
The
case of Abu Wael remains unresolved, but the Kurds' claims that the Iraqi regime provided al Qaeda members with weapons and
funding has been validated by other intelligence reporting. A May 2002 signals intelligence report, included in the Feith
memo, stated that "an Iraqi intelligence official, praising Ansar al Islam, provided it with $100,000 and agreed to continue
to give assistance." Another report from the National Security Agency in October 2002 said that "al Qaeda and Iraq reached
a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons." It
was this agreement that "reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq."
In
addition to Saddam's support for al Qaeda in Kurdish-controlled territories, we also know that Zarqawi was not alone in Baghdad.
According to the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Report, the CIA "described a network of more than
a dozen al Qaeda or al Qaeda-associated operatives in Baghdad" before the war.
The
intelligence community has downplayed the possibility that the Iraqi regime supported Zarqawi's prewar activities, including
the assassination of Laurence Foley. Intelligence community analysts, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report,
point out that "neither of the two suspects" in the shooting "provided any information on links between al-Zarqawi and the
Iraqi regime."
But
we also have testimony from one of the suspects in the murder that Zarqawi "directed and financed the operations of the cell"
responsible "before, during and after his stint in Baghdad between May and July 2002." And both of the suspects have said
that "one member of the al Zarqawi network traveled repeatedly between regime-controlled Iraq and Syria after March 2002."
Thus,
many in the intelligence community implausibly assume that Zarqawi could have planned terrorist attacks from neo-Stalinist
Baghdad and had one of his operatives travel in and out of Iraqi regime-controlled territory without Saddam's approval. The
next question is obvious: If it is so easy for regime foes to maintain a long-term presence in Baghdad and to transit in and
out of Iraq, why was it so difficult for the CIA to operate there? This assumption flies in the
face of everything we know about Saddam and his control over Iraq.
* * *
"The
CIA had no [redacted] credible reporting on the leadership
of either the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda, which would have enabled it to better define a cooperative relationship, if any did
in fact exist. As a result, the CIA refrained from asserting that Iraq and al Qaeda had cooperated on terrorist attacks."
Senate Intelligence Committee report, July 7, 2004
THE
CONCLUSION of the Senate Intelligence Committee report--that the CIA did
not have the type of intelligence reporting that "would have enabled it to better define a cooperative relationship"--was
ignored by the press. We now have reporting that demonstrates the nature of the relationship. One day there will be much more.
At a large warehouse in Doha, Qatar, the Defense Intelligence Agency is reviewing millions of pages of documents from the
former Iraqi regime. That process is painfully slow due to a lack of resources and a lack of interest in pursuing the full
story of Iraqi support for terrorism.
That
lack of interest is not new. As the anonymous intelligence analyst told the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I don't think
we were really focused on the CT [counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the IIS going out and pro-actively
conducting terrorist attacks." That the intelligence community did not pay particular attention to Saddam Hussein's terrorist
aspirations created a sizable blind spot.
Why
wouldn't Saddam Hussein conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. interests? The United States regularly bombed targets in Iraq--at
times almost daily--in support of the no-fly zones. We conducted more significant attacks in January and June 1993, and again
in 1996 and 1998. The CIA attempted to foment a coup in 1996. The U.N. sanctions
sought to deprive Saddam of the resources he needed to sustain a robust military. The weapons inspections occupied his top
officials and hundreds of intelligence officers. From 1998 forward, after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the official
policy of the United States was to end his regime. With that policy came support of Iraqi opposition groups who existed to
remove him from power. For Saddam, then, the Gulf war never ended. He routinely accused the United States of "terrorism" and
"genocide." The state-run Iraqi media threatened to exact revenge for more than a decade.
Further,
Saddam had proven his willingness to use asymmetric means of retaliation time and again. He attempted to use his own intelligence
service and terrorist surrogates against the United States during the first Gulf war. He assisted a fugitive from the 1993
World Trade Center attacks. He attempted to assassinate George H.W. Bush. He sought to blow up the U.S. government's Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters. He openly supported terrorist activity in the region. "From 1996 to 2003," according
to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, "the IIS focused its terrorist activities on western interests, particularly
against the U.S. and Israel."
We
know that in the context of a decade-long confrontation with the United States, Saddam reached out to al Qaeda on numerous
occasions. We know that the leadership of al Qaeda reciprocated, requesting assistance in its endeavors. We know that reports
of meetings, offers of safe haven, and collaboration persisted.
What
we do not know is the full extent of the relationship. But we know enough to know that there was one. And we know enough to
know it was a threat.
Stephen
F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard and author of The Connection (HarperCollins). Thomas Joscelyn is an economist and writer living in New York.