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Sharon Begley
The ‘Geo-Engineering’ Scenario
Why even a desperate measure is starting to look reasonable.
Nov 23,
2007 Newsweek
After
decades spent studying volcanoes, Alan Robock can list 20 reasons why humans should not try to play God with the world's climate
by, well, mimicking Krakatoa. Proponents of "geo-engineering" actually like the idea because the eruptions spread sulfate
aerosols and other particles throughout the planet's atmosphere, reflecting incoming sunlight. The resulting cooling might
counter the global warming caused by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. But that's not all sulfates do, which is where
Robock's list comes in.
The
particles also deplete the planet's ozone layer, which is just starting to repair itself now that ozone-shredding chemicals
are banned. They cause acid rain, too. And by cooling large land masses like Asia and Africa, the heat-reflecting particles
reduce the temperature difference between them and the already-cooler oceans, which could stifle the monsoons that millions
of people depend on for agriculture. Because the particles block direct sunlight more than diffuse rays, they also alter the
balance of radiation reaching Earth's surface, with unknown consequences for plants that can be kind of finicky about the
kind of sunlight they need.
And
yet … In a sign of how dangerous global warming is starting to look and of how pitiful the world's efforts to control
greenhouse gases are, even Robock—list and all—hedges his bets. Geo-engineering, allows the Rutgers University
meteorologist, "might be held in reserve for an emergency."
The prospect of a climate emergency has put geo-engineering, which experts have been weighing since at least 1992,
on the drawing board more than ever before. That reflects two alarming developments. The first is that some projections of
climate change, far from being Cassandra-ish, are turning out to be too conservative. According to satellite measurements,
sea levels rose 3.3 millimeters per year from 1993 to 2006; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had projected less
than 2 millimeters. Also, the IPCC projected loss of arctic sea ice at 2.5 percent per decade from 1953 to 2006. It's actually
been 7.8 percent, or 30 years ahead of projections. Greenland's ice sheets, too, are melting faster than expected. If other
consequences of climate change—heat waves, storms and severe droughts like the one now gripping the southeast—also
turn out to be worse than projected, the world may become desperate for a way to turn down the thermostat much faster than
reducing CO2 emissions can accomplish. (Especially since emissions are trending the wrong way. In the 1990s, they
increased 1 percent a year. In the early 2000s, 3 percent a year.)
The
physics of geo-engineering is not in dispute. Studies of volcanoes established what amount of particles produces how much
cooling, as well as how the particles spread and how long they remain aloft (a year or two). Knowing this, it should be possible
to roll back the global warming projected for 2100 enough to return the planet to its climate of 1900, Damon Matthews and
Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution reported in June.
The
devil, however, is in the details. Injecting sulfates into the atmosphere—by lofting big, aerosol-filled balloons or
rockets—would reduce global precipitation to below the levels of 1900, their study showed, threatening agriculture.
Cooling would be uneven, with some regions benefiting more than others. (What would Russia, which might benefit from global
warming, do if India, which would suffer, decided to cool things down through geo-engineering?) And if the world stopped geo-engineering
and therefore unmasked the effects of CO2 that had been accumulating all along, the effect could be calamitous,
as temperatures shot up 20 times faster than current warming, notes Matthews. That would be harder to adapt to than an equal
rise spread over more time.
Geo-engineering
cannot replace emissions reductions. The less CO2 you have to balance with sulfates, the more effective geo-engineering
would be. But reducing CO2 emissions by, say, substituting solar and nuclear for coal will only delay climate change.
Any net emissions will eventually tip the atmosphere into
dangerous territory. If the world wants a techno-fix for climate change, it must develop ways to capture CO2 from
the air and seas.
Researchers
are trying, but they have less financial support than producers of corn-based ethanol (which does next to nothing to help
climate change). Still, one company is developing a system in which plastic mesh sheets blowing in the wind capture CO2
from the air. When saturated with CO2, the sheets are doused with sodium carbonate, yielding harmless baking soda,
after which they can be reused. Another approach would remove hydrochloric acid from seawater, which would make oceans less
acidic and thus able to absorb more CO2. About 100 treatment plants could reduce the CO2 entering the
atmosphere by 15 percent, scientists report in the journal Environmental Science & Technology; 700 could offset all CO2
emissions.
Neither
method is ready to go. Without more funding, they never will be, though Richard Branson's $25 million prize for carbon capture
is an incentive. If we don't want to resort to the climate solution of last resort, it's time to stop pretending that changing
light bulbs and driving hybrids will be enough to prevent dangerous climate change.
The Climate Engineers by James R. Fleming
Beyond
the security checkpoint at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Ames Research Center at the southern
end of San Francisco Bay, a small group gathered in November for a conference on the innocuous topic of “managing solar
radiation.” The real subject was much bigger: how to save the planet from the effects of global warming. There was little
talk among the two dozen scientists and other specialists about carbon taxes, alternative energy sources, or the other usual
remedies. Many of the scientists were impatient with such schemes. Some were simply contemptuous of calls for international
cooperation and the policies and lifestyle changes needed to curb greenhouse-gas emissions; others had concluded that the
world’s politicians and bureaucrats are not up to the job of agreeing on such reforms or that global warming will come
more rapidly, and with more catastrophic consequences, than many models predict. Now, they believe, it is time to consider
radical measures: a technological quick fix for global warming.
“Mitigation
is not happening and is not going to happen,” physicist Lowell Wood declared at the NASA conference. Wood, the star
of the gathering, spent four decades at the University of California’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
where he served as one of the Pentagon’s chief weapon designers and threat analysts. (He reportedly enjoys the
“Dr. Evil” nickname bestowed by his critics.) The time has come, he said, for “an intelligent elimination
of undesired heat from the biosphere by technical ways and means,” which, he asserted, could be achieved for a tiny
fraction of the cost of “the bureaucratic suppression of CO2.” His engineering approach, he boasted,
would provide “instant climatic gratification.”
Wood advanced
several ideas to “fix” the earth’s climate, including building up Arctic sea ice to make it function like
a planetary air conditioner to “suck heat in from the midlatitude heat bath.” A “surprisingly
practical” way of achieving this, he said, would be to use large artillery pieces to shoot as much as a million tons
of highly reflective sulfate aerosols or specially engineered nanoparticles into the Arctic stratosphere to deflect
the sun’s rays. Delivering up to a million tons of material via artillery would require a constant bombardment—basically
declaring war on the stratosphere. Alternatively, a fleet of B-747 “crop dusters” could deliver the particles
by flying continuously around the Arctic Circle. Or a 25-kilometer-long sky hose could be tethered to a military superblimp
high above the planet’s surface to pump reflective particles into the atmosphere.
Far-fetched
as Wood’s ideas may sound, his weren’t the only Rube Goldberg proposals aired at the meeting. Even as they joked
about a NASA staffer’s apology for her inability to control the temperature in the meeting room, others detailed their
own schemes for manipulating earth’s climate. Astronomer J. Roger Angel suggested placing a huge fleet of mirrors in
orbit to divert incoming solar radiation, at a cost of “only” several trillion dollars. Atmospheric scientist
John Latham and engineer Stephen Salter hawked their idea of making marine clouds thicker and more reflective by whipping
ocean water into a froth with giant pumps and eggbeaters. Most frightening was the science-fiction writer and astrophysicist
Gregory Benford’s announcement that he wanted to “cut through red tape and demonstrate what could be done”
by finding private sponsors for his plan to inject diatomaceous earth—the chalklike substance used
in filtration systems and cat litter—into the Arctic stratosphere. He, like his fellow geoengineers, was largely
silent on the possible unintended consequences of his plan.
The inherent
unknowability of what would happen if we tried to tinker with the immensely complex planetary climate system is one reason
why climate engineering has until recently been spoken of only sotto voce in the scientific community. Many researchers recognize
that even the most brilliant scientists have a history of blindness to the wider ramifications of their work. Imagine, for
example, that Wood’s scheme to thicken the Arctic icecap did somehow become possible. While most of the world may want
to maintain or increase polar sea ice, Russia and some other nations have historically desired an ice-free Arctic
ocean, which would liberate shipping and open potentially vast oil and mineral deposits for exploitation. And an engineered
Arctic ice sheet would likely produce shorter growing seasons and harsher winters in Alaska, Siberia, Greenland, and elsewhere,
and could generate super winter storms in the midlatitudes. Yet Wood calls his brainstorm a plan for “global climate
stabilization,” and hopes to create a sort of “planetary thermostat” to regulate the global climate.
Who would
control such a “thermostat,” making life-altering decisions for the planet’s billions? What is
to prevent other nations from undertaking unilateral climate modification? The United States has no monopoly on such dreams.
In November 2005, for example, Yuri Izrael, head of the Moscow-based Institute of Global Climate and Ecology Studies,
wrote to Russian president Vladimir Putin to make the case for immediately burning massive amounts of sulfur in the stratosphere
to lower the earth’s temperature “a degree or two”—a correction greater than the total warming since
pre-industrial times.
There is,
moreover, a troubling motif of militarization in the history of weather and climate control. Military leaders in the United
States and other countries have pondered the possibilities of weaponized weather manipulation for decades. Lowell Wood himself
embodies the overlap of civilian and military interests. Now affiliated with the Hoover Institution, a think tank at Stanford
University, Wood was a protégé of the late Edward Teller, the weapons scientist who was credited with developing the
hydrogen bomb and was the architect of the Reagan-era Star Wars missile defense system (which Wood worked
on, too). Like Wood, Teller was known for his advocacy of controversial military and technological solutions to complex problems,
including the chimerical “peaceful uses of nuclear weapons.” Teller’s plan to excavate an artificial harbor
in Alaska using thermonuclear explosives actually came close to receiving government approval. Before his death in 2003,
Teller was advocating a climate control scheme similar to what Wood proposed.
Despite
the large, unanswered questions about the implications of playing God with the elements, climate engineering is now being
widely discussed in the scientific community and is taken seriously within the U.S. government. The Bush administration has
recommended the addition of this “important strategy” to an upcoming report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the UN-sponsored organization whose February study seemed to persuade even the Bush White House
to take global warming more seriously. And climate engineering’s advocates are not confined to the small group that
met in California. Last year, for example, Paul J. Crutzen, an atmospheric chemist and Nobel laureate, proposed a scheme similar
to Wood’s, and there is a long paper trail of climate and weather modification studies by the Pentagon and other government
agencies.
As the
sole historian at the NASA conference, I may have been alone in my appreciation of the irony that we were meeting on the site
of an old U.S. Navy airfield literally in the shadow of the huge hangar that once housed the ill-starred Navy dirigible
U.S.S. Macon. The 785-foot-long Macon, a technological wonder of its time, capable of cruising at
87 miles per hour and launching five Navy biplanes, lies at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, brought down in 1935 by strong
winds. The Navy’s entire rigid-airship program went down with it. Coming on the heels of the crash of its sister ship,
the Akron, the Macon’s destruction showed that the design of these technological marvels was fundamentally
flawed. The hangar, built by the Navy in 1932, is now both a historic site and a Superfund site, since it has been discovered
that its “galbestos” siding is leaching PCBs into the drains. As I reflected on the fate of the Navy dirigible
program, the geoengineers around the table were confidently and enthusiastically promoting techniques of climate intervention
that were more than several steps beyond what might be called state of the art, with implications not simply for a handful
of airship crewmen but for every one of the 6.5 billion inhabitants of the planet.
Ultimate
control of the weather and climate excites some of our wildest fantasies and our greatest fears. It is the stuff of age-old
myths. Throughout history, we mortals have tried to protect ourselves against harsh weather. But weather control was
reserved for the ancient sky gods. Now the power has seemingly devolved to modern Titans. We are undoubtedly facing an uncertain
future. With rising temperatures, increasing emissions of greenhouse gases, and a growing world population, we may be on the
verge of a worldwide climate crisis. What shall we do? Doing nothing or too little is clearly wrong, but so is doing too much.
Largely
unaware of the long and checkered history of weather and climate control and the political and ethical challenges it poses,
or somehow considering themselves exempt, the new Titans see themselves as heroic pioneers, the first generation capable of
alleviating or averting natural disasters. They are largely oblivious to the history of the charlatans and sincere but deluded
scientists and engineers who preceded them. If we fail to heed the lessons of that history, and fail to bring its perspectives
to bear in thinking about public policy, we risk repeating the mistakes of the past, in a game with much higher stakes.
Three stories
(there are many more) capture the recurring pathologies of weather and climate control schemes. The first involves 19th-century
proposals by the U.S. government’s first meteorologist and other “pluviculturalists” to make artificial
rain and relieve drought conditions in the American West. The second begins in 1946 with promising discoveries in cloud seeding
that rapidly devolved into exaggerated claims and attempts by cold warriors to weaponize the technique in the jungles
of Vietnam. And then there is the tale of how computer modeling raised hopes for perfect forecasting and ultimate control
of weather and climate—hopes that continue to inform and encourage present-day planetary engineers.
James Pollard
Espy (1785–1860), the first meteorologist employed by the U.S. government, was a frontier schoolmaster and lawyer until
he moved to Philadelphia in 1817. There he supported himself by teaching mathematics and classics part time while
devoting himself to meteorological research. Working through the American Philosophical Society and the Franklin Institute,
Espy gained the support of Pennsylvania’s legislature to equip weather observers in each county in the state with barometers,
thermometers, and other standard instruments to provide a larger, synoptic picture of the weather, especially the passage
of storms.
Espy viewed
the atmosphere as a giant heat engine. According to his thermal theory of storms, all atmospheric disturbances, including
thunderstorms, hurricanes, and winter storms, are driven by “steam power.” Heated by the sun, a column of air
rises, allowing the surrounding air to rush in. As the heated air ascends, it cools and its moisture condenses, releasing
its latent heat (this is the “steam”) and producing rain, hail, or snow. The thermal theory is now an accepted
part of meteorology, and for this discovery Espy is well regarded in the history of science.
His stature
has been diminished, however, by his unbridled enthusiasm for rainmaking. Espy suggested cutting and burning vast tracts of
forest to create huge columns of heated air, believing this would generate clouds and trigger precipitation. “Magnificent
Humbug” was one contemporary assessment of this scheme. Espy came to be known derisively as the “Storm King,”
but he was not deterred.
Seeking
a larger stage for his storm studies and rainmaking proposals, Espy moved in 1842 to Washington, D.C., where he was funded
by the Navy and employed as the “national meteorologist” by the Army Medical Department. This position afforded
him access to the meteorological reports of surgeons at Army posts around the country. He also collaborated with Joseph Henry
at the Smithsonian Institution to establish and maintain a national network of volunteer weather observers.
The year
Espy moved to Washington, the popular magazine writer Eliza Leslie published a short story in Godey’s Lady’s
Book called “The Rain King, or, A Glance at the Next Century,” a fanciful account of rainmaking set
in 1942 in Philadelphia, in which Espy’s great-great-grand-nephew offers weather for the Delaware Valley on
demand. Various factions vie for the weather they desire. Three hundred washerwomen petition the Rain King for fine weather
forever, while cabmen and umbrella makers want perpetual rain. An equal number of applications come from both the fair- and
foul-weather camps, until the balance is tipped by a late request from a winsome high-society matron desperately
seeking a hard rain to prevent a visit by her country-bumpkin cousins that would spoil the lavish party she is planning.
Of course,
when the artificial rains come, they satisfy no one and raise widespread suspicions. The Rain King, suddenly unpopular because
he lacks the miraculous power to please everybody, takes a steamboat to China, where he studies magic in anticipation of returning
someday. “Natural rains had never occasioned anything worse than submissive regret to those who suffered inconvenience
from them, and were always received more in sorrow than in anger,” Leslie wrote. “But these artificial rains were
taken more in anger than in sorrow, by all who did not want them.”
Leslie
had identified the fundamental political pitfalls of manufactured weather that dog it to this day. But the enthusiasm for
pluviculture was just beginning. During the Civil War, some began to suspect that the smoke and concussion of artillery fire
generated rain. After all, didn’t it tend to rain a day, or two, or three following most battles? Skeptics wondered
whether generals simply preferred to fight under fair skies, with rainy days therefore tending naturally to follow, and some
pointed out that Plutarch had noticed the correlation between battles and rainfall long before the invention of gunpowder.
Nevertheless, in 1871 retired Civil War general Edward Powers argued in favor of cannonading in his book War and the Weather,
or, The Artificial Production of Rain.
Two decades
later, the publication of the second edition of Powers’s book coincided with a severe and prolonged western drought,
prompting a congressional appropriation of $10,000 for a series of field experiments. Secretary of Agriculture Jeremiah Rusk,
nominally in charge of both this project and the newly formed U.S. Weather Bureau, chose as the lead investigator Robert St.
George Dyrenforth, a flamboyant patent lawyer from Washington, D.C., who possessed no scientific or military experience. Dyrenforth
arrived in Texas in August during a severe drought, but also conveniently at the traditional (and commonly noted) onset of
the Texas rainy season. He brought an arsenal of explosives, including bombs, cannon, and hydrogen balloons, to be detonated
at various altitudes, and engaged in what one observer called “a beautiful imitation of a battle.”
After several
months of assaults on the heavens, it did indeed rain. Dyrenforth claimed victory, concluding that his practical skills, combined
with his use of special explosives “to keep the weather in an unsettled condition,” could cause or at least enhance
precipitation—when conditions were favorable! He warned that bombarding the sky in dry weather,
however, would be fruitless, since his technique could stimulate clouds and precipitation but not create them.
The
Nation,
which criticized the government for wasting tax dollars, observed that the effect of the explosion of a 10-foot hydrogen
balloon on aerial currents would be less than “the effect of the jump of one vigorous flea upon a thousand-ton
steamship running at a speed of twenty knots.” But if there is one lesson from the long history of efforts to modify
the weather and climate, it is that neither commonsense criticism nor flops deter geoengineers.
Just over
100 years after Espy arrived in Washington, another seminal episode in the history of weather and climate control commenced
at the General Electric Research Laboratory in Schenectady, New York. On a warm, humid day in 1946, a laboratory technician
named Vincent Schaefer dropped some dry ice into a home freezer unit he was using as a cloud chamber. To his surprise, he
saw the moisture in his breath instantly transform into millions of tiny ice crystals. He had generated the ice cloud from
“supercooled” water droplets. As Schaefer recalled, “It was a serendipitous event, and I was smart enough
to figure out just what happened. . . . I knew I had something pretty important.” Soon after, another member of the
GE team, Bernard Vonnegut of MIT, discovered that silver iodide smoke also “caused explosive ice growth” in supercooled
clouds.
On November
14, 1946, Schaefer rented an airplane and dropped six pounds of dry ice pellets into a cold cloud over Mount Greylock in the
nearby Berkshires, creating ice crystals and streaks of snow along a three-mile path. According to Schaefer’s
laboratory notebook, “It seemed as though [the cloud] almost exploded, the effect was so widespread and rapid.”
Schaefer’s boss was Nobel laureate Irving Langmuir, a chemist who had worked on generating military smoke screens and
de-icing aircraft in World War II—and who did not lack for media savvy. Langmuir watched the experiment from the control
tower of the airport, and he was on the phone to the press before Schaefer landed. According to an article in The New York
Times the next day, “A single pellet of dry ice, about the size of a pea . . . might produce enough ice nuclei to
develop several tons of snow,” or perhaps eliminate clouds at airports that might cause dangerous icing conditions,
thus, in the words of the story’s headline, “Opening Vista of Moisture Control by Man.” The Boston Globe headline
read “Snowstorm Manufactured.”
From this
moment on, in the press and before the meteorological community, Langmuir expounded his sensational vision of large-scale
weather control, including redirecting hurricanes and changing the arid Southwest into fertile farmland. His first paper on
the subject used familiar military terminology to explain how a small amount of “nucleating” agent such as dry
ice, silver iodide, or even water could cause a “chain reaction” in cumulus clouds that potentially could release
as much energy as an atomic bomb, but without radioactive fallout. The Department of Defense took due note. It would take
an intense interest in the military possibilities of weather modification in the years ahead.
Ironically,
in 1953, at the very same time Langmuir was involved in making exaggerated and highly dubious claims for the efficacy of weather
and climate modification, he presented a seminar at GE titled “Pathological Science,” or “the science of
things that aren’t so.” Yet there is hardly any scientific foundation for most claims about weather modification.
Cloud seeding apparently can augment “orographic” precipitation (which falls on the windward side of mountains)
by up to 10 percent. It is also possible to clear cold fogs and suppress frost with heaters in very small areas. That is the
extent of what has been proved. Nevertheless, millions are still spent on cloud seeding today, largely by local water and
power companies.
About the
time Langmuir was giving his seminar, the great futurist and science- fiction writer H. G. Wells toured the GE labs, and
the young publicist who escorted him tried to interest the writer in its weather control research. Wells gave a lukewarm
response. The young man was Bernard Vonnegut’s brother, Kurt, and he took up the subject himself in the novel Cat’s
Cradle (1963), in which a quirky and amoral scientist named Felix Hoenikker, loosely modeled on both
Irving Langmuir and Edward Teller, invents a substance called “ice-nine” that instantly freezes
water and remains solid at room temperature. Hoenikker’s intent is to create a material that would be useful to armies
bogged down in muddy battlefields, but the result is an unprecedented ecological disaster. Vonnegut got the idea of ice-nine
from Langmuir, who suggested it to Wells as a story line.
Weather
modification technology seemed of such great potential, especially to military aviation, that Vannevar Bush, a friend of Langmuir’s
who had served as head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, brought the issue to the
attention of Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Pentagon immediately convened a committee to study the development of a Cold War weather weapon. It was hoped that cloud seeding
could be used surreptitiously to release the violence of the atmosphere against an enemy, tame the winds in the service of
an all-weather air force, or, on a larger scale, perhaps disrupt (or improve) the agricultural economy of nations
and alter the global climate for strategic purposes. Military planners generated strategic scenarios such as hindering the
enemy’s military campaigns by causing heavy rains or snows to fall along lines of troop movement and on vital airfields,
or using controlled precipitation as a delivery system for biological and radiological agents. Tactical possibilities included
dissipating cloud decks to enable visual bombing attacks on targets, opening airfields closed by low clouds or fog, and relieving
aircraft icing. Some
in the military had already recognized the potential uses of weather modification, and the subject has remained on military
minds ever since. In the 1940s, General George C. Kenney, commander of the Strategic Air Command, declared, “The nation
which first learns to plot the paths of air masses accurately and learns to control the time and place of precipitation will
dominate the globe.” His opinion was echoed in 1961 by the distinguished aviator-engineer Rear Admiral Luis
de Florez: “With control of the weather the operations and economy of an enemy could be disrupted. . . . [Such control]
in a cold war would provide a powerful and subtle weapon to injure agricultural production, hinder commerce, and slow down
industry.” He urged the government to “start now to make control of weather equal in scope to the Manhattan .
. . Project which produced the first A-bomb.”
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Howard
T. Orville, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s weather adviser, published an influential 1954 article in Collier’s
that included a variety of scenarios for using weather as a weapon of warfare. Planes would drop hundreds of balloons containing
seeding crystals into the jet stream. Downstream, when the fuses on the balloons exploded, the crystals would fall into the
clouds, initiating rain and miring enemy operations. The Army Ordnance Corps was investigating another technique: loading
silver iodide and carbon dioxide into 50-caliber tracer bullets that pilots could fire into clouds. A more insidious technique
would strike at an adversary’s food supply by seeding clouds to rob them of moisture before they reached enemy agricultural
areas. Speculative and wildly optimistic ideas such as these from official sources, together with threats that the Soviets
were aggressively pursuing weather control, triggered what Newsweek called “a weather race with the Russians,”
and helped fuel the rapid expansion of meteorological research in all areas, including the creation of the National Center
for Atmospheric Research, which was established in 1960.
Weather
warfare took a macro-pathological turn between 1967 and ’72 in the jungles over North and South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia. Using technology developed at the naval weapons testing center at China Lake, California, to seed clouds by
means of silver iodide flares, the military conducted secret operations intended, among other goals, to “reduce trafficability”
along portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which Hanoi used to move men and materiel to South Vietnam. Operating out of Udorn
Air Base, Thailand, without the knowledge of the Thai government or almost anyone else, but with the full and enthusiastic
support of presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, the Air Weather Service flew more than 2,600 cloud seeding sorties
and expended 47,000 silver iodide flares over a period of approximately five years at an annual cost of some $3.6 million.
The covert operation had several names, including “POPEYE” and “Intermediary-Compatriot.”
In March
1971, nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson broke the story about Air Force rainmakers in Southeast Asia in The
Washington Post, a story confirmed several months later with the leaking of the Pentagon Papers and splashed on the
front page of The New York Times in 1972 by Seymour Hersh. By 1973, despite stonewalling by Nixon administration officials,
the U.S. Senate had adopted a resolution calling for an international treaty “prohibiting the use of any environmental
or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war.” The following year, Senator Claiborne Pell (D.-R.I.), referring
to the field as a “Pandora’s box,” published the transcript of a formerly top-secret briefing
by the Defense Department on the topic of weather warfare. Eventually, it was revealed that the CIA had tried rainmaking in
South Vietnam as early as 1963 in an attempt to break up the protests of Buddhist monks, and that cloud seeding was probably
used in Cuba to disrupt the sugarcane harvest. Similar technology had been employed, yet proved ineffective, in drought relief
efforts in India and Pakistan, the Philippines, Panama, Portugal, and Okinawa. All of the programs were conducted under military
sponsorship and had the direct involvement of the White House.
Operation
POPEYE, made public as it was at the end of the Nixon era, was dubbed the “Watergate of weather warfare.” Some
defended the use of environmental weapons, arguing that they were more “humane” than nuclear weapons. Others suggested
that inducing rainfall to reduce trafficability was preferable to dropping napalm. As one wag put it, “Make mud, not
war.” At a congressional briefing in 1974, military officials downplayed the impact of Operation POPEYE, since the most
that could be claimed were 10 percent increases in local rainfall, and even that result was “unverifiable.” Philip
Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences, represented the mainstream of scientific opinion when he observed,
“It is grotesquely immoral that scientific understanding and technological capabilities developed for human welfare
to protect the public health, enhance agricultural productivity, and minimize the natural violence of large storms should
be so distorted as to become weapons of war.”
At a time
when the United States was already weakened by the Watergate crisis, the Soviet Union caused considerable embarrassment to
the Ford administration by bringing the issue of weather modification as a weapon of war to the attention of the United Nations.
The UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)
was eventually ratified by nearly 70 nations, including the United States. Ironically, it entered into force in 1978, when
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, where the American military had used weather modification technology in war only
six years earlier, became the 20th signatory.
The language
of the ENMOD Convention may become relevant to future weather and climate engineering, especially if such efforts are conducted
unilaterally or if harm befalls a nation or region. The convention targets those techniques having “widespread, longlasting
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other State Party.” It uses the term “environmental
modification” to mean “any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural
processes—the dynamics, composition, or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere,
and atmosphere, or of outer space.”
A vision
of perfect forecasting ultimately leading to weather and climate control was present at the birth of modern computing, well
before the GE cloud seeding experiments. In 1945 Vladimir Zworykin, an RCA engineer noted for his early work in television
technology, promoted the idea that electronic computers could be used to process and analyze vast amounts of meteorological
data, issue timely and highly accurate forecasts, study the sensitivity of weather systems to alterations of surface conditions
and energy inputs, and eventually intervene in and control the weather and climate. He wrote:
The eventual
goal to be attained is the international organization of means to study weather phenomena as global phenomena and to channel
the world’s weather, as far as possible, in such a way as to minimize the damage from catastrophic disturbances, and
otherwise to benefit the world to the greatest extent by improved climatic conditions where possible.
Zworykin
imagined that a perfectly accurate machine forecast combined with a paramilitary rapid deployment force able literally
to pour oil on troubled ocean waters or even set fires or detonate bombs might someday provide the capacity to disrupt storms
before they formed, deflect them from populated areas, and otherwise control the weather.
John von
Neumann, the multi-talented mathematician extraordinaire at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, endorsed
Zworykin’s view, writing to him, “I agree with you completely. . . . This would provide a basis for scientific
approach[es] to influencing the weather.” Using computer-generated predictions, von Neumann wrote, weather
and climate systems “could be controlled, or at least directed, by the release of perfectly practical amounts of energy”
or by “altering the absorption and reflection properties of the ground or the sea or the atmosphere.” It was a
project that neatly fit von Neumann’s overall philosophy: “All stable processes we shall predict. All unstable
processes we shall control.” Zworykin’s proposal was also endorsed by the noted oceanographer Athelstan Spilhaus,
then a U.S. Army major, who ended his In weather control meteorology has a new goal worthy of its greatest efforts.”
In a 1962
speech to meteorologists, “On the Possibilities of Weather Control,” Harry Wexler, the MIT-trained head
of meteorological research at the U.S. Weather Bureau, reported on his analysis of early computer climate models and additional
possibilities opened up by the space age. Reminding his audience that humankind was modifying the weather and climate “whether
we know it or not” by changing the composition of the earth’s atmosphere, Wexler demonstrated how the United States
or the Soviet Union, perhaps with hostile intent, could alter the earth’s climate in a number of ways. Either nation
could cool it by several degrees using a dust ring launched into orbit, for example, or warm it using ice crystals lofted
into the polar atmosphere by the explosion of hydrogen bombs. And while most practicing atmospheric chemists today believe
that the discovery of ozone-destroying reactions dates to the early 1970s, Wexler sketched out a scenario for destroying the
ozone layer using chlorine or bromine in his 1962 speech.
“The
subject of weather and climate control is now becoming respectable to talk about,” Wexler claimed, apparently hoping
to reduce the prospects of a geophysical arms race. He cited Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s mention of weather control
in an address to the Supreme Soviet and a 1961 speech to the United Nations by John F. Kennedy in which the president proposed
“cooperative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control.” Wexler was
actually the source of Kennedy’s suggestions, and had worked on them behind the scenes with the President’s Science
Advisory Committee and the State Department. But if weather control’s “respectability” was not in question,
its attainability—even using computers, satellites, and 100-megaton bombs—certainly was.
In 1965,
the President’s Science Advisory Committee warned in a report called Restoring the Quality of Our Environment
that increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide due to the burning of fossil fuels would modify the earth’s heat balance
to such an extent that harmful changes in climate could occur. This report is now widely cited as the first official statement
on “global warming.” But the committee also recommended geoengineering options. “The possibilities of deliberately
bringing about countervailing climatic changes . . . need to be thoroughly explored,” it said. As an illustration, it
pointed out that, in a warming world, the earth’s solar reflectivity could be increased by dispersing buoyant reflective
particles over large areas of the tropical sea at an annual cost, not considered excessive, of about $500 million. This technology
might also inhibit hurricane formation. No one thought to consider the side effects of particles washing up on tropical beaches
or choking marine life, or the negative consequences of redirecting hurricanes, much less other effects beyond our imagination.
And no one thought to ask if the local inhabitants would be in favor of such schemes. The committee also speculated about
modifying high-altitude cirrus clouds to counteract the effects of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. It failed to mention
the most obvious option: reducing fossil fuel use.
After the
embarrassment of the 1978 ENMOD Convention, federal funding for weather modification research and development dried up, although
freelance rainmakers continued to ply their trade in the American West with state and local funding. Until recently, a 1991
National Academy of Sciences report, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, was the only serious document in decades
to advocate climate control. But the level of urgency and the number of proposals have increased dramatically since the turn
of the new century.
In September
2001, the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program quietly held an invitational conference, “Response Options to Rapid
or Severe Climate Change.” Sponsored by a White House that was officially skeptical about global warming, the meeting
gave new status to the control fantasies of the climate engineers. According to one participant, “If they had broadcast
that meeting live to people in Europe, there would have been riots.”
Two years
later, the Pentagon released a controversial report titled An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United
States National Security. The report explained how global warming might lead to rapid and catastrophic global cooling
through mechanisms such as the slowing of North Atlantic deep-water circulation—and recommended that the government
“explore geoengineering options that control the climate.” Noting that it is easier to warm than to
cool the climate, the report suggested that it might be possible to add various gases, such as hydrofluorocarbons,
to the atmosphere to offset the effects of cooling. Such actions would be studied carefully, of course, given their potential
to exacerbate conflict among nations.
With greater
gravitas, but no less speculation, the National Research Council issued a study, Critical Issues in Weather Modification
Research, in 2003. It cited looming social and environmental challenges such as water shortages and drought,
property damage and loss of life from severe storms, and the threat of “inadvertent” climate change as justifications
for investing in major new national and international programs in weather modification research. Although the NRC study included
an acknowledgment that there is “no convincing scientific proof of the efficacy of intentional weather modification
efforts,” its authors nonetheless argued that there should be “a renewed commitment” to research in the
field of intentional and unintentional weather modification.
The absence
of such proof after decades of efforts has not deterred governments here and abroad from a variety of ill-advised
or simply fanciful undertakings. The NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, for example, has provided $475,000 for atmospheric
scientist Ross Hoffman’s research on beaming satellite-based microwaves at hurricanes as a means of redirecting
them—as if it were possible to know where a storm was originally headed or that its new path would not lead
straight to calamity. In 2005, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R.-Texas) introduced legislation “to develop and implement
a comprehensive and coordinated national weather modification research policy and a national cooperative Federal and State
program of weather modification and development.” (Significantly, the Texas Department of Agriculture already supports
weather modification programs covering one-fifth of the state.) And China has announced that its Study Institute for Artificial
Influence on the Weather will attempt to manipulate Beijing’s weather by cloud seeding in order to ensure optimum conditions
for the 2008 Olympics.
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With great
fanfare, atmospheric chemist Paul J. Crutzen, winner of a 1995 Nobel Prize for his work on the chemistry of ozone depletion,
recently proposed to cool the earth by injecting reflective aerosols or other substances into the tropical stratosphere using
balloons or artillery. He estimated that more than five million metric tons of sulfur per year would be needed to do the job,
at an annual cost of more than $125 billion. The effect would emulate the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines,
which covered the earth with a cloud of sulfuric acid and other sulfates and caused a drop in the planet’s average temperature
of about 0.5°C for roughly two years. Unfortunately, Mount Pinatubo may also have contributed to the largest ozone hole ever
measured. The volcanic eruption was also blamed for causing cool, wet summers, shortening the growing season, and exacerbating
Mississippi River flooding and the ongoing drought in the Sahel region of Africa.
Overall,
the cooling caused by Mount Pinatubo’s eruption temporarily suppressed the greenhouse warming effect and was stronger
than the influence of the El Niño event that occurred at the same time. Crutzen merely noted that if a Mount Pinatubo–scale
eruption were emulated every year or two, undesired side effects and ozone losses should not be “as large,” but
some whitening of the sky and colorful sunsets and sunrises would occur. His “interesting alternative” method
would be to release soot particles to create minor “nuclear winter” conditions.
Crutzen
later said that he had only reluctantly proposed his planetary “shade,” mostly to “startle” political
leaders enough to spur them to more serious efforts to curb greenhouse-gas emissions. But he may well have produced the opposite
effect. The appeal of a quick and seemingly painless technological “fix” for the global climate dilemma should
not be underestimated. The more practical such dreams appear, the less likely the world’s citizens and political leaders
are to take on the difficult and painful task of changing the destiny that global climate models foretell.
These issues
are not new. In 1956, F. W. Reichelderfer, then chief of the U.S. Weather Bureau, delivered an address to the National
Academy of Sciences, “Importance of New Concepts in Meteorology.” Reacting to the widespread theorizing and speculation
on the possibilities of weather and climate control at the time, he pointed out that the crucial issue was “practicability”
rather than “possibility.” In 1956 it was possible to modify a cloud with dry ice or silver iodide, yet it was
impossible to predict what the cloud might do after seeding and impracticable to claim any sense of control over the weather.
This is still true today. Yet thanks to remarkable advances in science and technology, from satellite sensors to enormously
sophisticated global climate models, the fantasies of the weather and climate engineers have only grown. Now it is possible
to tinker with scenarios in computer climate models—manipulating the solar inputs, for example, to demonstrate
that artificially increased solar reflectivity will generate a cooling trend in the model.
But this
is a far cry from conducting a practical global field experiment or operational program with proper data collection and analysis;
full accounting for possible liabilities, unintended consequences, and litigation; and the necessary international support
and approval. Lowell Wood blithely declares that if his proposal to turn the polar icecap into a planetary air conditioner
were implemented and didn’t work, the process could be halted after a few years. He doesn’t mention what harm
such a failure could cause in the meantime.
There are
signs among the geoengineers of an overconfidence in technology as a solution of first resort. Many appear to possess a too-literal
belief in progress that produces an anything-is-possible mentality, abetted by a basic misunderstanding of
the nature of today’s climate models. The global climate system is a “massive, staggering beast,” as oceanographer
Wallace Broecker describes it, with no simple set of controlling parameters. We are more than a long way from understanding
how it works, much less the precise prediction and practical “control” of global climate.
Assume,
for just a moment, that climate control were technically possible. Who would be given the authority to manage it? Who would
have the wisdom to dispense drought, severe winters, or the effects of storms to some so that the rest of the planet could
prosper? At what cost, economically, aesthetically, and in our moral relationship to nature, would we manipulate the climate?
These questions
are never seriously contemplated by the climate wizards who dream of mastery over nature. If, as history shows, fantasies
of weather and climate control have chiefly served commercial and military interests, why should we expect the future to be
different? Have you noticed all the cannons? From Dyrenforth’s cannonading in Texas to Crutzen’s artillery barrage
of the stratosphere, military means and ends have been closely intertwined with thinking about control of the weather and
climate. In 1996 the U.S. Air Force resurrected the old Cold War speculation about using weather modification for military
purposes, claiming that “in 2025, U.S. aerospace forces can ‘own the weather’ by capitalizing on emerging
technologies and focusing development of those technologies to war-fighting applications.” In addition to
conventional cloud seeding methods, the Air Force visionaries proposed computer hacking to disrupt an enemy’s weather
monitors and models and the use of emerging technologies to create clouds of particles that could block an enemy’s optical
sensors. Hurricanes were also fair game for weaponization. The Air Force pointed out that weather modification, unlike other
approaches, “makes what are otherwise the results of deliberate actions appear to be the consequences of natural weather
phenomena.”
Given such
mindsets, it is virtually impossible to imagine governments resisting the temptation to explore military uses of any potentially
climate-altering technology.
When Roger
Angel was asked at the NASA meeting last November how he intended to get the massive amount of material required for his space
mirrors into orbit, he dryly suggested a modern cannon of the kind originally proposed for the Strategic Defense Initiative:
a giant electric rail gun firing a ton or so of material into space roughly every five minutes. Asked where such a device
might be located, he suggested a high mountaintop on the Equator.
I was immediately
reminded of Jules Verne’s 1889 novel The Purchase of the North Pole. For two cents per acre, a group of
American investors gains rights to the vast and incredibly lucrative coal and mineral deposits under the North Pole.
To mine the region, they propose to melt the polar ice. Initially the project captures the public imagination, as the backers
promise that their scheme will improve the climate everywhere by reducing extremes of cold and heat, making the earth a terrestrial
heaven. But when it is revealed that the investors are retired Civil War artillerymen who intend to change the inclination
of the earth’s axis by building and firing the world’s largest cannon, public enthusiasm gives way to fears that
tidal waves generated by the explosion will kill millions. In secrecy and haste, the protagonists proceed with their plan,
building the cannon on Mount Kilimanjaro. The plot fails only when an error in calculation renders the massive shot ineffective.
Verne concludes, “The world’s inhabitants could thus sleep in peace.” Perhaps he spoke too soon.
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James R. Fleming, a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center and holder of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science’s Roger Revelle Fellowship in Global Environmental Stewardship, is a professor of science, technology, and
society at Colby College, in Waterville, Maine. His books include Meteorology in America, 1800–1870 (1990), Historical
Perspectives on Climate Change (1998), and The Callendar Effect: The Life and Work of Guy Stewart Callendar (2007).
Reprinted from Spring 2007 Wilson Quarterly This article may not be resold, reprinted,
or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. For further reprint information,
please contact Permissions, The Wilson Quarterly, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
Phone:202/691-4200 E-mail:wq@wilsoncenter.org
copyright 2010 NewRuskinCollege
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